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ABSTRACT: Here I  list and organize some logical and conceptual problems in Section 18 (about
the cognoscibility of the thing in itself) and Section 19 (about the extension of this result to the
world) in Schopenhauer´s main work. When Schopenhauer put out the analogical argument for the
responsibility for transmitting (übertragen)  the problematic identification thing in itself/will,  he
brought to his philosophy the following fragile points of such an argument: (i) the logical invalidity;
(ii) the lack of criterion for the extension scope; (iii)  the indeterminacy of what is really being
extended; (iv) the unrestricted character of his analogical extension; (v) the indirect  nature of his
argument (for avoiding the solipsism); and (vi) the collapse of what is being extended. I then try to
point  out  why -  despite  these logical  fragile  points  -  the  analogical  argument  seems not  to  be
problematic at all to Schopenhauer. 
KEY-WORDS: Analogical arguments, Solipsism, Thing in itself.
RESUMO: Aqui listo e organizo alguns problemas lógicos e conceituais dos parágrafos 18 (sobre a
cognoscibilidade da coisa em si) e 19 (sobre a extensao deste resultado ao mundo) na obra principal
de Schopenhauer. Quando Schopenhauer coloca a responsabilidade no argumento por analogia de
transmitir  (übertragen)  a  problemática  identificação  coisa  em  si/vontade,  ele  traz  para  a  sua
Filosofia os seguintes pontos frágeis deste argumento: (i) a invalidade lógica; (ii) a falta de critério
para o alcance da extensao; (iii) a indeterminação do que está sendo realmente extendido; (iv) o
caráter  irrestrito  da  extensão  analógica;  (v)  a  natureza  indireta  do  argumento  (para  evitar  o
solipsismo); e (vi) o colapso do que está sendo extendido. Assim tento apontar por que, apesar
destes pontos frágeis, este argumento por analogia parece nao ser de forma alguma problemático
para Schopenhauer. 
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Argumentos por analogia, solipsismo, coisa-em-si.
“O que tem de ser tem muita força.”(Graciliano Ramos, In: Angústia)
This paper begins with the instructive search for a common logical structure among
the analogical arguments present in sciences and daily discourses, highlighting its negative
and positive  aspects.  Here  we focus  on the  intuition  that  the same discursive structure
brings the same problem to a theoretical context, i.e., a general structure means general
1 I am highly indebted to the constructive criticism of Prof. Dra. Vera Cristina Bueno, Prof. Dra. Déborah
Danowsky, Prof. Dr. Luiz Carlos Pereira and Prof. Dr. Mathias Kossler on early versions of this article. 
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problems.  Consequently,  I  try  to  find  this  “portable”  common  logical  form  for  the
analogical tools in the argumentation used by Schopenhauer in Section 19 of The World as
Will  and  Representation2. This  approach  reveals  that  there  are  the  same  underlying
problems, besides other specific ones, which emerge from the generality of what is being
tried there: to hold that everything in the world has essentially the same will as that which I
find  in  my  body.  In  German,  Übertragung means  an  extension,  a  transmission,  or
transference - meanings that appear clearly in the expression im übertragenen Sinn, used to
show an analogy between individuals or domains by means of resemblance, transporting
the meaning of a context to another. The aim in this part of the paper is to investigate the
extent to which the  fundamental problems in the analogical argument can “contaminate”
Schopenhauer´s  philosophy.  In  order  to  realise this  aim,  I  explore  two  meanings  of
Übertragung: the meaning of transmission, in the case of extension and transference of
results or properties by means of an analogy, and the meaning of contamination.  I then
highlight  the  organic  character  of  Schopenhauer´s  Philosophy  and  possible  threats
generated by the analogical argument against its “organism” health. In Section 19 there is
an obvious case of an  analogische Übertragung, that is, an extension or transmission of
properties via analogy or resemblance between elements of the domain in question. The
domain here is the world, and the elements, everything that compounds or can compound
our empirical experience.
Moreover,  in  order to understand Section 19 we have to  examine Section 18 in
detail. That is why I try to deal with some more general problems with the thesis presented
in Section 18 relating to the knowledge of the thing-in-itself, which “der eigentümlichste
und  wichtigste  Schritt  meiner  Philosophie  ist,  nämlich  den  von  Kant  als  unmöglich
aufgegeben Übergang von der Erscheinung zum Dinge an sich3”.  The problems in these
two sections are too robust and central to be overlooked, even by authors and readers that
concentrate themselves on Schopenhauer´s ethics or aesthetics. It is not problematic to call
this  pair  of  sections  problematic  in  his  work.  Volker  Spierling  in  his  Lexikon to
Schopenhauer recognizes this fact:
2 For purposes of convention and efficiency, when referring to Schopenhauer´s main work The World as Will
and Representation, I will write WWV. Additionally, I will use the numbers I and II to designate respectively
the volume one or two of WWV.  The second volume (published in 1844) is enhanced with supplementary
chapters  to  the  first  sections,  the  main  part  of  his  work,  published  in  1819.  All  translations  from texts
originally written in Portuguese are my own. 
3 SCHOPENHAUER, WWV II, p. 233.
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Wie  kann  dieser  Gedanke  von  der  doppelten  Leiberfahrung  für  die
Erkenntnis des Dings an sich genutzt  werden? Schopenhauer steht  hier
mitten  in  der  Schmiede  seiner  Metaphysik.  Er  prüft  die  Werkzeuge.
Womit lässt sich das Innere der Dinge aufschließen? Eine unmittelbare
Erkenntnis  der  Innenseite  der  Natur  kommt  nicht  in  Frage,  weil  der
Mensch  über  kein  übersinnliches  Erkenntnisvermögen  verfügt.(...)
Gemeint ist mit „Innenseite“ das, was unabhängig vom Bewusstsein, vom
Intellekt ist, was also an sich ist: Ding an sich.  Das Werkzeug, zu dem
Schopenhauer  greift,  ist  der  Analogieschluss. Diese  methodische
Entscheidung  gehört  sicherlich  zu  den  fragwürdigsten  Seiten  seiner
Philosophie. (…)  Die  Welt  als  Vorstellung  hat  –  analog  zum
menschlichen Leib – noch eine andre Seite: die Welt als Wille4. 
We can notice in this way that the problem of the thing-in-itself in other bodies and
the problem of the will in other bodies are not the same problem. They can stand separately,
keeping in mind one important further point: the second problem depends on the first. So,
there  seems  to  be  no  controversy  among  the  Interprets  and  even  literally  in  the
Schopenahuer´s  Philosophy  that  Section  19  is  the  locus  classicus of  the  analogical
procedure  occurrence  to  extend  the  philosophical  truth  of  Section  18  (i.e.  that  the
thing-in-itself = will) to all things in the world5. It is for their resemblance to me, to my
extended and consecutive body, subject to cause and effects, that I justify that other things
of the world have the same essence that I have just found in me through introspection.
Finally, I end this paper by discussing and listing some reasons for the use of the
analogical argument which, although seemingly unproblematic for Schopenhauer, is found
to be weak in all secondary literature. 
***
4 SPIERLING, 2002, p. 48. My italics.
5 “Der  springende  Punkt,  die  kühne  Spekulation  der  Metaphysik  Schopenhauers  besteht  darin,  dass  das
Schema der eigenen Leiberfahrung – Willensseite und Vorstellungsseite – durch einen Analogieschluss auf
die gesamte Natur überträgt. Die Wille-Leib-Identität gilt als Modell für die Welt. Das, was sich uns lediglich
als Vorstellung darstellt, beispielsweise andere Menschen, Tiere, Pflanzen, anorganische Natur, wird analog
zur eigenen Leiberfahrung gedeutet, und um eine vorstellungsabgewandte Willensseite ergänzt. Schopenhauer
unterlegt spekulativ der ganzen Welt einen Willen, der dem menschlichen Willen, wie wir ihn an uns selbst
erfahren, ähnliche sein soll. Er setzt die äußere Erfahrung mit der inneren in Verbindung und macht dabei die
innere Erfahrung zum Schüssel jener“ SPIERLING, 2002, p. 66.
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Antonio Zilhão, author of the entry “analogical argument6” in the Enciclopédia de
Termos Lógico-filosóficos, defines it as: 
An argument that infers the satisfaction of a property Φ by an object B,
using the analogy that can be verified between the object B and the object
A, which we know previously that satisfy the property  Φ.  The existent
analogy between the objects  A and B can be clarified in terms of  the
existence of a certain group of properties that is satisfied by A and by B
(p. 59).
In  fact,  any  resemblance  of  two  objects  can  be  considered,  in  an  analogical
argument, in order to justify the extension or transference of some other features from one
to the other. Nevertheless, it is intuitive that because A resembles B in a specific quality or
portion, large or small, it does not follow, necessarily, that A and B have other properties
and/or relations in common.  Considering this rigorously, we do not need to operate with
sophisticated calculi in formal systems in order to know clearly that arguments based on the
analogy of predicates shared by different objects or subjects are invalid arguments. That is,
even  if  the  premises  (or  whatever) is  brought  to  justify  the  conclusion  are  true,  the
conclusion does not have to be. In other words, even if the conclusion happens to be true,
just  like  these  premises  are,  the  truth-values  are  independent.  We  can  easily  think  of
counter-examples which can clearly show their vulnerability.
6 There are historically three kinds of analogical arguments: one with platonic origin, with an emphasis on the
proportionality relation between terms or domains to be compared with another. We say, for example, that A
is related to a P, just like a B is related to a Q, in such a way that the relationships between PA and QB are
analogous or alike. There is a second kind of analogical  argument present  in the medieval theology, the
emphasis of which is to be found in the relation of participation or imitation. We say, for example,  that
creatures are good because their Good imitates God´s Goodness, in such a way that the creatures´ and God´s
Goodness are analogous or alike. Finally, we have a third kind of analogical argument that circumscribes this
paper, which has its emphasis in the notion of ascribing a property or relation via community or resemblance
between different investigated domains or individuals.  We intend to justify the passage or transference of
some features of a domain to another via some relevant resemblance between them. There are traditional
examples of disputes about the analogical reasoning in the philosophical field, such as in the field of the
English empiricism. A common onus to the primacy of the sensory experience in the epistemology is to
interdict, for example, the knowledge of minds external to mine. It is through an analogy to my body and my
behavior that I can ascribe mind to other human beings, even if I do not truly have any directly or sensorial
access to their minds. In this way we can avoid solipsism as a threat to the empiricism legitimacy. It can be
revealing to note that both the form of the argument (via analogy) and its itinerary (the comparison of others
bodies with mine), will reappear in the Schopenhauer´s Philosophy, in a great measure, in order to overcome
the same undesired alternative (the solipsism). Here we can also be more speculative. We can even hold the
Tractatus of Wittgenstein – informed as it was by Schopenhauer - as another philosophical perspective that
deals with an analogy, but between logical structures via a Bildkonzeption der Sprache (cf. 2.1-2.225), and a
peculiar form of solipsism (cf. 5.6 – 5.641).
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It  seems  clear  that  there  is  an  intuitive  restriction  on  the  validity  of  -  or  an
accusation of illegitimacy against - analogical arguments, even in common daily speech.
This fact shows that - at least in this point - a formal restriction can be altogether justified
and accompanied by intuitive elements of discourses in natural language. For example, one
can think of such a situation: a guest at a party asks his friend if the beer inside his cup is
cold or not. The friend answers that it is not, wondering as he does: “how do you know that
I am drinking beer, if my cup is completely dark?”  Here is a perfect scenario, in which the
first character can use analogies between his own cup, and its contents, to justify his correct
guess about the content of his friend’s, thinking as he does: “Because our cups are similar,
they resemble each other, and my beer is too warm for me, I believe I will complain about
it”. I assume that the two example characters here do not see necessity or certainty in this
argument. They do not hold this inference as necessary, correct or strictly valid or even
legitimate, although there is a certain degree of contextual relationship between premises
and conclusion. Surely, they would not think something like this: “Our cups are similar;
therefore  they  “have  to”  contain  the  same  liquid”.  But,  rather:  “Our  cups  are  similar;
therefore “it is possible” that they have the same content”.  The emphasis here has to be
found in  this  predication  of  modality:  that  is  that  “it  is  possible”,  “it  is  likely”,  “it  is
probable” or – conversely - “it is not necessary”. Nothing like “has to be” or “must be” or
“surely” in a strong sense could possibly be acceptable in this  situation be that  for the
friends,  listeners-in  to  their  conversation,  or  logicians.  Similarity  between  domains  or
objects is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition: using the same example, even if the
cups were different, they could still have the same content.
Many further circumstances or forms of evidence that can be listed may make the
argument  stronger  or  make  the  analogical  implication  or  inference  more  certain,  even
without providing it with necessity or validity. There are several factors which affect the
probability of analogical arguments. Everyone at the party knows that each kind of cup
being used at the party can be designated for different kinds of drinks (i.e. dark cups may
be used for beer; light-colored cups for wine, and plastic cups for soft drinks etc.). It may
also be that one of the friends knows that the other only drinks beer at parties. Or the guest
may even know that only beer and soft drinks are being served at the party - a situation that
restricts the range of potential beverages to just two choices. In each case, even if we could
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list all the additional circumstances, or good reasons, and relevant contextual evidence in
order to supply the analogical argument or reasoning (i.e. the two guests have the same type
of cups, therefore they are drinking the same type of drink), these would not be sufficient to
conduct us necessarily to the conclusion based on the premises. For it is possible that the
friend´s cup could ultimately contain any other liquid, or non-liquid, or it may even be
empty. 
Nevertheless,  analogical  arguments,  in  spite  of  being  invalid,  are  not
epistemological innocuous, just like related inductive and abductive arguments. A fortiori,
analogical extensions can play a positive and decisive role, including within sophisticated
domains of discourse. They can act for example, as, methodological conductors in scientific
research.  Any  correlate  idea  can  be  explored  by  a  scientist  or  become  a  topic  for
consideration at a meeting of biotechnologists. At a hypothetical meeting, scientists may
find that as “the vaccination functions with pigs and apes, it is – therefore - extremely likely
that it will work in human beings as well, because their immunological systems are alike”.
There is no strict logical necessity here either. Both the scientist and the biotechnologist at
the  meeting  know  that,  even  when  they  have  not  studied  logic  more  systematically.
Moreover, if there were a logical necessity it would condemn experiments or empirical tests
as irrelevant, as their importance comes precisely from the lack of analyticity between the
premises (or what we already know) and the conclusion (what we are looking for). Clearly,
the analogical argument counts in this context as a methodological north or strategic bridge
which justifies what the next most suitable research step should be for clinical tests. In this
way, analogical research plays the role of directing our expectations, even if they will not
be fulfilled in the future. 
It is in no way surprising that we can uncover this reasoning in another scientific
context different to laboratory research: Brazil, China and India all have large populations,
major productive power, great levels of internal consumption, with potential to grow fast,
large  offer  of  commodities,  which  can supply their  internal  market  as  well  as  external
demands.  Keeping these factors in mind, the three nations could, therefore, be considered
as belonging to the same category or type of country, that of emerging countries. So far so
good  as  it  seems  trivial  to  hold  that  empirical  observations  contribute  to  the  sense
composition of empirical propositions and to the classification of items in a more or less
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organized, not-definite or not-exhaustive way. Nevertheless, no study in Economics would
infer a conclusion about the stock market of one country based on that of another without
observing  some  additional  resemblances,  such  as  geopolitical,  economical  or  financial
factors. For example, no reliable economist would declare that “The Brazilian stock market
will  follow the Chinese stock market”.  Such an affirmation  would be weak and highly
disputable. For, notwithstanding their many striking resemblances, there are indeed many
differences between the two countries and their economies which justify skepticism when
making assertions  and reasoning based on such analogies.  In  principle,  other  inductive
arguments,  or  additional  relevant  observations  or  forms  of  evidence  can  systematically
increase the plausibility or probability of analogical arguments, but these are not sufficient
to sustain any necessity between the premises and the conclusion. To continue on with our
example, it is plausible that an economist may think that “As in previous economic crises
similar  to this  current  one,  emergent  countries  (because of their  similar  production and
consumption  strength)  have  recovered  faster  than  other  nations,  therefore,  emergent
countries  like  China,  India  and  Brazil  can  recover  faster  now.”  The  modalization  is
necessary once again. “They can be free from the crisis faster than other countries, but it is
not necessary”. Indeed, counter-examples can be taken from Russia – a nation similar to the
emergent countries in terms of the aforementioned criteria but also different, as there is no
foreseeable date for satisfactory economic recovery in Russia as yet. 
Although  it  may  be  appealing,  it  is  neither  the  degree  of  resemblance,  nor  the
iteration of additional circumstances, nor the supplementation by inductive arguments that
will bring necessity to the analogical arguments. In the natural sciences, this “logical fact”
is  advantageous,  since scientists  deal  systematically  with  models  that  can and must  be
substituted by other ones that are likely to be more adequate to describe and predict the
state  of  a  specific  field  under  observation  -  whether  in  terms  of  investigating
immunological systems or macroeconomic debates. This fact clearly shows that there are
degrees of likeability that will sustain the strength of the modality in the conclusion from
the assumption or truth of the premises.
The problem with the analogical problems is not restricted to its validity in a logical
sense. Rather, a great deal of its weakness is in the argument’s foundation – founded as it is
on a lack of criteria – and justification of the extension scope of properties or attributes via
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resemblance. If this scope has to be restricted at any time through questions such as: How
many dark cups are there being used at the party? Are there some that are not dark at all? Is
the vaccination suitable for all human beings, irrespective of their age, ethnic background
or gender? or What about emergent countries which are not democracies? Is the economical
resemblance  strong  enough  to  justify  inferences  about  one  of  the  countries  based  on
another?... Depending on the relevance of the criteria or on the objects of the referential
basis, the analogical extension may be too restricted or too permissive. In extreme cases, it
can make the group of predicates (or the analytical base) somewhat trivial,  since all the
objects in the domain discourse could be found to have a common predicate, as can, indeed,
every object in any possible domain when considered in terms of loose logical properties
(such as “being identical to itself” or “not being strictly contradictory”).  
Another  not  strictly  logical  problem  with  analogical  argumentation  is  in  the
indeterminacy  of  what  is  being  extended:  More  than  what  one  previously  wanted  (or
expected) to be extended can be extended. For as, just as with the friend from our example
who made assumptions about the contents of his friend’s cup based on the existence of
impurities in his own; or with the scientists who accept that some peculiar features of a
pig’s  organism also  belong  to  apes  and  –  by  extension  -  to  human  beings;  or  in  the
unjustified belief that the Chinese political regime is as democratic as India’s, just because
they share some productive resemblances. Many conclusions - robust or not - that do not
follow from the premises can be generated and, while more or less artificial, all of them
show the fragility of analogical arguments and the vague points in analogical reasoning. 
What these examples illustrate is that the transference of any predicate or relation
from any one object, individual, aggregate, phenomenon, or domain to another is not totally
reliable.  Such  transference,  therefore,  needs  a  reasonable  and  relevant  methodological
justification. Otherwise, it can be too vulnerable to numerous counter-examples. Analogy
based  on  the  resemblance  of  predicates  is  neither  sufficient  nor  necessary  to  invoke
necessity  between  implications  or  inferences  in  any  discursive  domains  -  be  they
sophisticated  (such  as  in  the  fields  of  biology  and  economics)  or  trivial  (such  as  a
conversation amongst friends at a party). In fact, it is problematic to depend on an invalid
argument when we deal with central themes of a universe of discourse or when we are in a
domain in which central theses are involved in a theory. Indeed, a simplistic presumption
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based on an analogical argument can weaken the entire discourse, if its use is not justified
or relevantly supplied by other arguments or evidence. 
***
So far, I have tried to examine how arguments in extra-philosophical domains that
involve analogies have problems. I have also tried to show the extent to which the structure
of analogy seems to repeat itself; unfolding, as it does, in such a manner that its general
form can have a certain contextual autonomy7. Consequently, my natural next step is to
assume  that  this  common  structure  can  be  portable  and  applicable  in  the  analysis  of
arguments  in  which  analogical  reasoning  appear,  including  within  the  discourse  of
Philosophy. In fact, all these problems with analogical arguments appear in the background
of Section 19 of Schopenhauer´s WWV I – a problematic but central or key section in the
work. In short, in this section, the philosopher extends the already problematic result of
Section 18 (thing-in-itself as will) to all phenomena in the world.
Moreover,  I  find  that,  Schopenhauer,  besides  inheriting  proper  and  portable
problems of analogical extensions, presents others of his own in his philosophy. In fact, in
Section 19 of WWV I, there are structural problems with the analogical reasoning - as we
have  already  expected.  These  being:  (i)  logical  invalidity;  (ii)  lack  of  criteria  for  the
extension scope; and (iii) the indeterminacy of what is being extended. But even more: (iv)
the unrestricted character of its analogical extension (all the phenomena of the world) that
blurs, perhaps definitively, the different and vast resemblance degrees that composes the
world (v) the argument’s indirect character. - its strength and defense by the philosopher
coming  rather  from the  alternative’s  unacceptability  (solipsism).  And,  finally,  (vi)  the
collapse - perhaps improper, but justified by Schopenhauer’s transcendental considerations
- of what is being extended by the analogy to one’s body. 
At this point, this last assertion (vi) deserves already a short explanation. In general,
all the arguments previously presented do not collapse what is being extended into a same
entity or same thing. Although the aim with our first example is to maintain that there is the
same kind of liquid in the cups, they do not have to have the same source; for example, they
7 Antonio Zilhão illustrates this point in his entry to the already cited Enciclopédia.
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needn’t  necessarily  have  come  from  the  same  fridge  or  bottle.  And  with  the  second
example -  although the aim is  to justify  clinical  research on some medicines  that  have
already been  tested on animals - we do not assume there are the very same white cells that
flow in the immunological systems of different species,  or even in different individuals
from the same species. In the third example, although we try to foresee the behavior of
emergent economies in reaction to financial crises, we never assume that their economies,
with their active and passive products are strictly the same ones,  nor do we forget that
financial markets have a great deal of autonomy and various idiosyncrasies. This kind of
strong identity of what is being transmitted or extended by the analogy is not tried or even
expected  as  a  by-product  in  the  previous  arguments.  Schopenhauer  does  defend  this
collapse of what is being extended in Section 19. For, even if one’s will as the thing-in-
itself  is  extended  to  all  phenomena  of  the  world  by  means  of  their  phenomenal
resemblance,  it  is  strange,  and  even,  indeed,  somewhat  ironic  for  the  “world  of  the
analogies”  to  demand  that  this  to-be-extended  will  and  the  one  from the  investigated
domain are indeed the same. Thus revealing it to be highly unlikely that the item that is
being extended  is  the  very  same in  all  the  things  that  are  alike.  Here  is  an additional
problem which I do not find to be properly dealt with by Schopenhauer or by the secondary
literature.
In  her  seminal  book,  Schopenhauer  e  a  questão  do  dogmatismo,  Maria  Lucia
Cacciola  presents  Schopenhauer´s  problematic  analogical  argument.  In  this  succinct
paragraph Cacciola uncovers these problems: from its logical invalidity until the indirect
character of its reasoning, passing through the unrestricted extension which is insensitive
for the different degrees of resemblance. 
The  amplification  of  the  Will  as  the  essence  of  all  phenomena  is
established through an analogical procedure. Namely, the human body is a
representation that  differentiates  itself  from the other  in  respect  of  the
knowledge relationship,  being in  the  rest  equal  to  any other.  It  is  the
knowledge relationship in the body which shows a double aspect: on one
side,  as  an  immediate  knowledge  of  the  will,  and  on  the  other  side
mediately as representation.  To admit that this object differentiate itself
intrinsically from all other would mean the negation of the external world
reality. (...) This reality negation would consist exactly in what he calls
“theoretical  egoism”, which is  so suspicious as the “practical  egoism”.
(...)  The basis for this analogy which allows to give all phenomena the
same essence as the human one is to be founded at the fact that the other
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objects, considered as representation, are identical to my body, that is,
they fill the space and act through the causality law. And, in this way, just
as we can know our body in two different manners, we can by means of
an  analogy  admit  that  the  other  phenomena  are,  on  one  side,
representation  and  on  the  other,  “what  we  in  ourselves  call  will”  (...)
Therefore the duplicity, in the knowledge of the being and the action in
our bodies, turns out to be the key to the knowledge of the being in which
phenomenon8 (p. 50).
From this point, I intend to show that the analogical argument is too vulnerable to
be  so  central  in  the  Schopenhauer´s  Philosophy  without  any  kind  of  relevant
supplementation. Nevertheless, it may be revealing to investigate why this procedure does
not seem to be problematic to the philosopher. Part of the answer to this question can be
found in the supplementation of the missing strength in the resulting extension (will=thing
in-itself) from one’s body to the world by means of largely empirical observations and of
clearly naturalist procedures. In other words, Schopenhauer tries to supply the deficiencies
of  the  analogical  argument  with  examples  and  observations  taken  from  naturalist
compendium  and  from his  empirical  observations  in  order  to  compound  corroborative
evidence.  Rigorously speaking, however,  the quantity  of observation,  although relevant,
does not make his – or, indeed, any - argument valid. Another point here is that validity is
not relevant in this radical field of “knowledge” in which Schopenhauer operates in Section
19 and this fact is coherent with the tenets of his Philosophy. I will return to this point in
the last section of this paper.  
***
In the middle of Section 18 supplementation,  in WWV II, we can find both the
problems  circumscribed:  The  identification  of  the  thing-in-itself  with  the  will  and  the
analogical  extension  are  coordinated  and  interact  clearly  there,  including  the  already
mentioned non sequitur. 
Jedoch ist die innere Erkenntnis von zwei Formen frei, welche der äußern
anhängen, nämlich von der des Raums und von der alle Sinnesanschauung
vermittelnden Form der Kausalität.  Hingegen bleibt noch die Form der
8 CACCIOLA, 1994, p. 50. In italics, I highlight the parts that I hold as the most problematic.
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Zeit,  wie  auch  die  des  Erkanntwerdens  und  Erkennens  überhaupt.
Demnach hat in dieser innen Erkenntnis das Ding an sich seiner Schleier
zwar großen Teils abgeworfen, tritt aber doch noch nicht ganz nackt auf.
(…) Aber dennoch ist die Wahrnehmung, in der wir die Regungen und
Akte des eigenes Willens erkennen, bei Weitem unmittelbarer,  als jede
andere: sie ist der Punkt, wo das Ding an sich am unmittelbarsten in die
Erscheinung tritt, und größter Nähe vom erkennenden Subjekt beleuchtet
wird;  daher eben der also intim erkannte Vorgang der  Ausleger  jedes
andern zu werden einzig und allein geeignet ist. (…)  Denn bei jedem
Hervortreten eines Willensaktes aus der dunklen Tiefe unsers Innern in
das  erkennende  Bewusstsein geschieht  ein  unmittelbarer  Übergang des
außer der Zeit liegenden Dinges an sich in die Erscheinung. Demnach ist
zwar  der  Willensakt  nur  die  nächste  und  deutlichste  Erscheinung  des
Dinges an sich; doch folgt hieraus, dass wenn alle übrigen Erscheinungen
ebenso unmittelbar und innerlich von uns erkannt werden könnten, wir sie
für  eben Das ansprechen müssten,  was de Wille  in  uns  ist. In  diesem
Sinne also lehre ich, dass das innere Wesen eines jeden Dinges Wille ist,
und nenne den Willen das Ding an sich9.
In this passage, I draw your attention to three problems (in italics above), namely:
(i) even with the experience of the body working as an efficient guiding theme, given the
Kantian  restriction  to  the  discovering  of  what  Schopenhauer  calls  das  philosophische
Wahrheit, we already have the time barrier and therefore, a knowledge of the thing-in-itself
as temporally conditioned, or body dependent, so to speak. It is worth asking if this taken as
knowledge, though peculiar, and not adjudicative; (ii) the body being the orientation point
which Schopenhauer calls the most characteristic and important step of his Philosophy, we
have to assume this precarious and inadequate knowledge as the interpretative key of all
things.  We  can  see  the  scenario’s  construction  here  and,  thus,  foresee  the  analogical
argument.  (iii)  Through  this  weak  modal,  “müssten”,  we  may  have  a  methodological
justification, a protocol or notification of a possibility, or even a metaphor, another meaning
of Übertragung, that cannot be grasped if we concentrate ourselves on just the argument to
be used in this extension10. As we will see, we need more than this argument to make this
transition more cogent. 
9 SCHOPENHAUER, WWV II, p. 230-1.
10 This weak modalization also appears in the EFJ Payne´s corresponding translation with “we should be
obliged to”: “Accordingly, the act of will is indeed only the nearest and clearest phenomenon of the thing in
itself, yet it follows from this, if all the other phenomena could be known by us just as immediately and
intimately, we should be obliged to regard them precisely as that which the will is in us.” (p. 197, WWV II,
trans. EFJ Payne.). 
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***
Before we investigate the logical and metaphysical problems that appear in Section
19 more carefully, it may be instructive to list and organize some more general problems
about the problematic Schopenhaurian thesis of the knowledge of the thing-in-itself. It is
worth noting that there is a kind of asymmetric relation here: we could investigate Section
18 without studying Section 19 but not the inverse. In order to deal properly with Section
19 we must deal with Section 18. Some problems are more artificial than others, especially
as my aim here is to highlight and exhaustively organize some logical lacuna, which are
brought about by the structure of the arguments. I try to show how some of them can be
easily answered by Schopenhauer. Here we have more an agenda of problems to be dealt
with, than a list of solutions. Consequently, the questions and the way they’re ordered are
more important for me in this context, than the answers.
First Problem: The solipsism threat (indirect argument)
If we really accept the robust idealism presented and defended by Schopenhauer in
the first book of WWV I (as well as in his praise for Berkeley and to the first edition of the
Critic of Pure Reason), solipsism and what he calls theoretical and practical egoism are
indeed comprehensible constant threats to his philosophy. The problem here emerges from
the legitimacy in searching for something different from my representations in the world.
Radically different, we say. To which extent is it legitimate to deal with something  toto
genere different and independent from the subject of knowledge and his representations?
The  Schopenhauerian  answer  certainly  takes  into  account  a  subjunctive  or  modal
presupposition: a possible double knowledge of things – an understanding Schopenhauer
holds as a result of the transcendental philosophy of Kant - conjugating it to the rebuttal of
strong skepticism,  as the last  fortress of the “theoresticher  Egoismus”.  In fact,  the first
justification  comes  from  a  kind  of  general  Kantian-schopenhauerian  principle,  where
everything can be held as a phenomenon or as a thing-in-itself. The second one comes from
making  something  that  appears  frequently  in  Schopenhauer’s  philosophy  explicit,
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something just like an indirect reasoning: we have x, because the alternative to x must be
avoided.
Das angeschaute  Objekt  aber  muss  etwas an  sich  selbst  sein und nicht  bloß
etwas für andere: denn sonst wäre es schlechthin nur Vorstellung, und wir hätten
einen  absoluten  Idealismus,  der  am Ende  theoretischer  Egoismus  würde,  bei
welchem alle Realität wegfällt und die Welt zum bloßen subjektiven Phantasma
wird11.
In regards to this, we must say that things have an itself, in order that the solipsism
does not become a plausible alternative. In other words, things must have an itself in order
that the world does not become a pure phantasmagoria to us.
Second Problem: Kantian restrictions (inside the fortress!)
The first problem is that of whether, indeed, there is the thing-in-itself or not. And if
there  is,  the  second problem here  is  over  if  it  makes  sense  to  say  it  is  the  will.  It  is
mandatory that Schopenhauer replies with the Kantian interdiction. To deal with knowledge
that is independent of our forms of knowledge demands explanation. Why do we have to
assume that the thing-in-itself with its entire negative predicates is the will as suggested and
defended  by  Schopenhauer?  His  answer  comes  from  the  possibility  of  a  Standpunkt
verlegen,  or  a  change of  the  point  of  view.  The key to  this  special  knowledge of  the
thing-in-itself is an intimate experience of our body assured by the double perspective of
the assumption: „Wir sehen schon hier, dass von außen dem Wesen der Dinge nimmermehr
beizukommen ist: wie immer man auch Forschen mag, so gewinnt man nichts, als Bilder
und Namen“12. This remarkable procedure is consequent to the Kantian restrictions, and I
say this due to the fact that no proof, argument, discourse or other traditional conceptual or
a priori procedures could be accepted in this domain. This “knowledge” is neither a priori
nor causal, because the “Leib ist ein vorstellungsgewordener Wille”.
11 SCHOPENHAUER, WWV II, p. 226. 
12 SCHOPENHAUER, WWV I, p. 142. Or even as Spierling affirms: “Der Leib ist nichts anderes als der
objektivierte,  zur  Vorstellung  gewordene  Wille.  (…)  Aufgrund  dieser  Identität  stehen  Wille  und  Leib
(Vorstellung gewordener Wille) in keinem kausalen Verhältnis zueinander. Vielmehr sind sowohl Aktionen
aufzufassen als ein sichtbar werdendes, aber noch zu entzifferndes und zu verstehendes Ausdrucksgeschehen
des Willensakten, des unsichtbaren Dings an sich” (SPIERLING, 2002, p. 65.). 
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Es  liegt  also  nicht  am  Mangelhaften  unserer  Bekanntschaft  mit  den
Dingen,  sondern  am  Wesen  des  Erkennens  selbst.  (…)  Diesem  allen
zufolge wird man auf dem Wege objektiven Erkenntnis, mithin von der
Vorstellung ausgehend,  nie  über  die  Vorstellung,  d.i.  die  Erscheinung,
hinausgelangen, wird also bei der Außenseite der Dinge stehen bleiben,
nie aber in ihr  Inneres dingen und erforschen können,  was sie an sich
selbst,  d.h.  für  sich  selbst,  sein  mögen.  Soweit  stimmte  ich  mit  Kant
überein.  Nun  aber  habe  ich,  als  Gegengewicht  dieser  Wahrheit,  jene
andere hervorgehoben, dass wir nicht bloß das erkennende Subjekt sind,
sondern  andrerseits  auch  selbst  zu  den  erkennenden  Wesen  gehören,
selbst  das  Ding  an  sich  sind;  das  mithin  zu  jenem selbsteigenen  und
inneren Wesen der Dinge, bis zu welchem wir von außen nicht dringen
können, uns ein Weg von innen offen steht, gleichsam ein unterirdischer
Gang, eine geheime Verbindung,  die uns wie durch Verrat,  mit Einem
Male in die Festung versetzt, welche durch Angriff von außen zu nehmen
unmöglich war13.
The will as thing-in-itself as defended by Schopenhauer in Section 18 is manifested,
exhibited or shown to individuals by means of a radical personal and internal experience of
the  body.  The  mistake,  to  which  all  Philosophers  –  says  Schopenhauer  here  –  are
vulnerable, is to try to attack the fortress from outside, without noting that we are already
inside of it. However, knowledge of the thing-in-itself is impossible, precisely because the
knowledge vanishes where the thing-in-itself begins and the knowledge then always only
deals with appearances.
Denn  sie  [die  philosophische  Wahrheit]  ist  nicht,  wie  alle  jene,  die
Beziehung einer abstrakten Vorstellung auf eine andere Vorstellung, oder
auf die notwendige Form des intuitiven, oder des abstrakten Vorstellens,
sondern ist die Beziehung eines Urteils auf das Verhältnis, welches eine
anschauliche Vorstellung, der Leib, zu dem hat, was gar nicht Vorstellung
ist, sondern ein von diesen toto genere Verschiedenes: Wille14
Third Problem: Loss of criteria (the insulated experience)
We can clearly note in this point of his work that we have less an argument than a
kind of revelation. According to Schopenhauer, the enigma, paradox or miracle key to the
phenomenon is the will. The question that we have to pose is: if the experience is internal
13 SCHOPENHAUER, WWV II, p. 228.
14 SCHOPENHUAER, WWV I, p. 143.
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and intimate, what ensures that the thing-in-itself is indeed the will and not, for example,
another internal state or profound feelings or any other faculty, such as love, hate, rage,
angst, or despair? It may even be an interesting intellectual exercise to think of the world as
having love or angst as its essence. The additional (and fascinating!) argument called to
supply this inadequacy is the understanding that 
Jeder wahre Akt seines Willens ist sofort und unausbleiblich auch eine
Bewegung seines Leibes. Er kann den Akt nicht wirklich wollen, ohne
zugleich wahrzunehmen, dass er als Bewegung des Leibes erscheint (…)
Die Aktion des Leibes ist  nichts Anderes,  als  der Objektivität  d.h.  zur
Vorstellung gewordene Wille ist. In der Reflektion allein ist Wollen und
Tun verschiedenen: in der Wirklichkeit sind sie Eins. Jeder wahre, echte,
unmittelbare Akt des Willes ist sofort und unmittelbar auch erscheinender
Akt des Leibes15.
To  want  is  to  act,  without  any  intermediary,  without  causal  relation,  without
consecutiveness, in an immediate and directly way. Here will/action is both the key and the
criteria to this identification.  “Das ist die Tatsache und das Problem”. This is indeed the
main argument in this section.
Fourth Problem: Normativity (wahrer Akt des Willens ↔ Bewegung)
 An additional problem here is a kind of normative or regulative problem. When the
strength of my argument lies on the legitimacy of an act, we can ask ourselves if any kind
of counter-example exists or would even be acceptable. If I will something but my body
does not move or action it is it that the willing isn’t “wirklich”, or a genuine or legitimate
willing. The not-movement works like a negative criterion for the genuine willing. By the
counter-positive, if there is no act, there was no genuine willing. But I could use this same
argument structure to defend any other candidate to the thing-in-itself. For example: In any
case that there was no act or movement, love, hate, angst or any other profound feeling one
may have felt was not genuine, not legitimate.  Once we accept the presuppositions and
premises  of  this  normative  argument,  there  is  no  way  out.  The  conclusion  follows
automatically:  This  kind  of  argument  resembles  problems  with  well-known  ad  hoc
15 SCHOPENHUAER, WWV I, p. 149.
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arguments: “It happened because it was God´s will”. “OK, but it did not happen at all.”
“Yeah, exactly, this is a clear sign that God really did not want it.” God´s legitimate will
regulates here what happens, what does not happen, and, indeed, if anything happens at all.
It will indeed always be normative criterion for what happen at all. 
Fifth Problem: Reduction (a multiplicity into one thing!)
It  seems that  Schopenhauer  makes  sense out  of  this  “choice”  of  the will  as  the
thing-in-itself  from amongst so many possible alternatives by using a kind of reduction
presupposition.  But other internal “phenomena” could be reduced in terms of will. For we
can ask ourselves  to  which  extent  it  is  really  possible  to  reduce  a  rich  multiplicity  of
feelings, thoughts, preferences, and/or emotions into terms of a unique will. What do we
gain with this kind of reduction? What do we lose? Could we, in principle, reduce will into
love or love into will? As Spierling points out in this context of reduction:
Zunächst  sieht  sich  Schopenhauer  falsch  verstanden,  wenn  die  innere
Wahrnehmung  vom  eigenen  Willen  schon  für  die  angemessene
Erkenntnis des Dings an sich gehalten wird. Gleichwohl ist die Erfahrung
vom eigenen Wollen, so wie sie sich im Selbstbewusstsein darstellt, die
für uns deutlichste Erscheinung, „Offenbarung“, „Sichtbarwerdung“ des
Dings an sich. Das eigene Wollen umfasst nicht nur die Willensakten und
die  Entschlüsse,  sondern  auch  alles  Begehren,  Streben,  Wünschen,
Verlangen, Hoffen, Leben, Freuen, Jubeln usw. Es gilt aber: Der Wille, so
wie wir ihn in uns finden und wahrnehmen, ist nicht eigentlich das Ding
an sich16.
Sixth problem: Exclusion (miracle or paradox par excellence?)
It does not seem conceptually legitimate or correct to ascribe two opposite (or even
contradictory!)  predicates  to  a  same  thing.  This  exclusion  problem  appears  when
Schopenhauer points out this kind of miracle  par excellence  (“schlechthin”) namely, the
coordination of the will  and the phenomena in the same individual,  using the formula:
“Mein  Leib  und  mein  Wille  sind  Eines”.  Schopenhauer  holds  his  Philosophy  is  the
explanation of the “miracle” of the coincidence of the will and the subject in the body.
Following the discursive restriction intuitively alluded to above, instead of the miracle par
16 SPIERLING, 2003, p. 46.
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excellence, we could talk about a suis generis case of paradox or absurdity par excellence.
Maybe this problem can be made clearer if we take the Schopenhauerian allegory about the
coin into account. According to this idea, the world would be like a coin on one side of
which is will while, on the other side, is representation. And it is with this allegory that
Schopenhauer tries to illustrate the notion of the coordination between thing-in-itself and
representation  in  a same  body.   Schopenhauer  establishes  the  difference  between
thing-in-itself and phenomena and draws some consequences. Most notably, he maintains
that  we have a negative  knowledge about  the first  by means of a  phenomenal  features
subtraction  or  negation  from the  second.  That  means:  We  have  the  thing-in-it-self  by
negative determination.  In a more straightforward way, we can say that phenomena are
successive  and extended;  they are the effects  or causes  of other  phenomena,  while  the
thing-in-itself  is  a non-phenomenon,  because it  differentiates  itself  radically  from these
insofar as it is not temporal. Rather, will is eternal – it is not spatial, it is not a plurality, it is
not a multiplicity, that is, it is one, and because it is outside the causal chain that domains
the  phenomena,  it  is  grundlos.  However,  not  being  spatial  does  not  mean  that  is  one.
Abstract  things  are  not spatial  and can be numerous,  even infinite,  or  can belong to a
plurality  or  multiplicity.  In  Schopenhauer  we  also  have  a  counter-example  of  this
assumption of uniqueness  via non-spatiality:  the ideas in WWV are many and they are
neither spatial nor temporal.
The  real  side  must  be  something  toto  genere different  from  the  world  as
representation. This negative approach to the thing-in-itself highlights this paradox, which
Schopenhauer has called “miracle”. Here thing-in-itself is non-phenomenon, in a way that
these two perspectives are exhaustive and exclusive – as with an instance of A and not-A. It
is  legitimate  to  question,  if  it  is  not  paradoxical  to  think  about  something  essentially
compounded  by  both.  Maybe  this  Schopenhauerian  coin,  which  has  on  one  side
representation (A) and on the other  will  (not-A), cannot  ultimately exist.  An additional
argument  here  is  implied  in  the  question:  Why  does  the  world  have  to  have  two
perspectives  and not  three,  four,  or  many  others?  The  reason is  that  A and not-A are
contradictory,  i.e.,  they  logically  exclude  any  other  possibility,  there  is  no  third  or
intermediate  possibility.  These  two  perspectives  are  exhaustive  because  they  are
contradictory,  or  radical  different.  “Denn  welche  andere  Art  von  Dasein  oder  Realität
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sollten wir der übrigen Körperwelt beilegen? Woher die Elemente nehmen, aus der wir eine
solche zusammensetzen? Außer dem Willen und der Vorstellung ist uns gar nichts bekannt,
noch denkbar17“.
In the words of Rubens Torres Filho, in his inspired presentationto Cacciola´s book:
“The world is indeed totally representation, but also, totally will, not to be represented or
destroyed: how we can sustain the challenge of this radicalization?” (p.16). My question:
How can we sustain  the challenge  of  this  paradox? I  guess  that  we can  also find this
“paradox” again in many other important parts of WWV, for instance, in the ethics (the
“miracle”  of  the  identity  between  the  knowledge  subject  and  the  ethical  subject)  and
aesthetics (identity between the individual and the pure subject).  Which are the possible
relationships between two aspects that are radically contrary to each other?
Seventh Problem: absolute negative (the difference can be much more radical!)
This difference between will and thing-in-it-self can be more radical and surprising
than we would expect. Why does the genuine thing-in-itself, which, in the rigorous sense
exists without any time barrier have to have any similarity with our will, and not with an
absolute nothing, just Schopenhauer signalizes in Section 18 of WWV II?
As Schopenhaer maintains in the supplements:
Unser Wollen ist die einzige Gelegenheit, die wir haben, irgendeinen sich
äußerlich darstellenden Vorgang zugleich aus seinem Innern zu verstehen,
mithin das einzige uns unmittelbar Bekannte und nicht, wie alles Übrige,
bloß  in  der  Vorstellung  Gegebene.(…)  Demnach  hat  in  dieser  innen
Erkenntnis das Ding an sich seine Schleier zwar großen Teils abgeworfen,
tritt aber doch noch nicht ganz nackt aus18.
Eighth Problem: Analogical argument (“the extension of the result”)
To situate its knowledge focus in a profound intimate experience with the body can
be consequent to trying to escaping from Kantian restrictions, but it prepares the stage for a
17 SCHOPENHAUER, WWV I, p. 149.
18 SCHOPENHAUER, WWV II , p. 220.
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larger and highly recalcitrant problem. As an intimate experience takes place within one’s
body and one’s will, how can one extend this result from an intimate experience to all the
things in the world? This problem with the extension based on an analogical argument can
be analyzed into others, which bring over new problems, namely: its indirect character, its
invalidity, the extension scope problem and the indeterminacy of what is being extended.
Here is the opportunity of a larger investigation, in order to establish some conceptual and
logical distinctions.
***
As  we  already  remarked,  in  Section  19  of  WWV I,  Schopenhauer  is  trying  to
extend, transfer or transmit the outlined in Section 18 (i.e. that will=thing-in-itself) to the
entire world as representation,  determined by the principle of sufficient  reason, with its
three forms - time, space and causality (already investigated by him in the first book). In
spite of the problems with the identification between will and thing-in-itself by the means
of an intimate experience within one’s own body, I will assume the result from Section 18.
We are allowed to do that, because of the already alluded asymmetry between sections 18
and 19. The intent here is to examine the extent to which this analogical argument, besides
not transferring the result adequately, can contaminate the whole Schopenhauerian work;
given that it is on this premise that Schopenhauer holds that the world is essentially will. 
My queries are about this Übertragung, done analogically, „nach Analogie“, based
on this „doppelte Erkenntnis, die wir von eigenen Leibe haben“. Schopenhauer prepares the
scenario for the extension of the result. The exegetical privilege given to the body must
apply to all things, because our body - just like all other things - has the forms inherent in
the principle of sufficient reason. Nevertheless, a way from within stands open to us to that
real inner nature of things. Just as one’s body is will  converted into representation,  the
world must be will that has become representation. Hence, according to Schopenhauer, just
like an action taken by one’s body is the act of the phenomenal will (i.e., will that appears
in intuition), so the world must also be it. This privileged internal vision that we have from
our bodies serves then as the point of resemblance for the foundation of the analogical
argument. 
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If we are not wrong, Schopenhauer can arrogate the Kantian heritage of a double
knowledge  thesis:  two  exhaustive  “ways”  of  analyzing  anything,  including  the  world.
Nevertheless,  it  seems  that  Schopenhauer  needs  something  stronger  than  a  modal  or
subjunctive exit for his philosophy in order, for example, to make sense of his moral theory.
It looks like sometimes that he needs that this double knowledge has to be founded upon a
double reality,  to make sense of his insistence on a profound and essential  relationship
between beings. In this sense, it is not just a simple change of epistemic perspective that
makes one bemitleiden with other beings but, rather, that we all essentially have something
in common. 
The first book of WWV I deals with explanation, etiology, morphology, abstraction,
rhetoric, discursive knowledge. And the second book deals with meaning, essence, sense,
reality, being, in-itself, and what looks like to demand, I hold, an independent nature or
reality. This can be an interesting case of a moral intervention in the epistemology: the
necessity of bringing other (moral) elements of Schopenhauerian philosophy to supply the
analogical  argument  weakness  and  the  solipsism  refuse.  “The  world  is  not  a
phantasmagoria” or “I am not alone in the world” are true assumptions either because there
is a coherently moral significance inherent to them or because of the moral feeling found in,
and justified by, the common essence of all things.
There is an additional  problem in this  supplementary movement to reinforce the
analogy by means of other concepts of Schopenhauer’s, namely: a  petitio principi. The
analogical argument is used to found the moral one, while at this point we are using the
moral to found the analogy. With analogical reasoning we aim to provide a good reason to
see a common essence in the world, say, the will. But now we are using the very same
moral  that  is  found in the  assumption  of  this  common essence  to  give  strength  to  the
analogy. Somehow, Mitleid cannot be assumed as a presupposition to the analogy, because
is supposed to be its “result”.  In other words, it  is from the thesis that comes from the
analogical argument, namely, that the world in itself is the will, that Schopenhauer sustains
Mitleid as the truly moral ground. 
There is, however, a clear problem with the analogical argument scope. How can we
determine the point where the extension should stop if, indeed, it must stop at any point at
all? In the examples given at the beginning of this paper I illustrated some extensions made
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through analogies which were clearly restricted to discrete domains or contexts:  i.e. the
cups were being used at a hypothetical party, the scientists were referring to animals with
similar  immune  systems,  and  the  economists  were  considering  countries  with  similar
organization and economical potential. In the case of Schopenhauer, the domain of analogy
is purposefully unrestricted, since each abstract representation only has meaning if it stands
for an intuitive instance. And, in turn, this intuitive instance only has meaning as a result of
being  the  manifestation  of  the  “itself”  of  the  world.  In  this  way,  we  find  that  all
representations, objects or phenomena in the world must have – either directly or indirectly
- the same itself as my body has, the same will. However, this process of stretching the
result can be too permissive in its demands on resemblance or similitude because of the
lack  of  good criteria  to  determinate  what  it  means,  indeed,  to  be alike.  This  fact  may
trivialize  the  analogy,  especially  if  the  criterion  to  determine  the  domain  and  the
resemblance  is  something  such  as  “everything  is  alike  which  is  identical  to  itself”  or
“everything is alike which respects the logical laws”. Such criteria trivialize the analogy
because any one thing in any domain can clearly hold such “resemblances”.  Or - as in
Schopenhauer´s  formulations  -  “everything  that  exists”,  as  well  as  “everything  that  is
extensive,  consecutive”,  and “everything that is phenomenal” must have the same itself
because  it  resembles  my  body.  Excessively  permissive  criteria  have  no  sensibility  to
distinguish the infinite spectrum or degrees of resemblance that exist. 
Such an issue can also veil another question: Is an object’s will stronger the more
similar it is to my body? Is Will proportional to the degree of its resemblance to my body?
Operating within a weaker sense of being alike – such as, a spatial sense – a situation may
arise wherein, for example, I am as alike to chairs or a stones as I am to dogs or horses
when we use this weak resemblance criterion. Even among human beings there are many
degrees of possible resemblance.  If we allow ourselves to adopt the moral intervention as
an additional element to make sense out of the analogical argument necessity we could
count with another criterion to the extension, not only the resemblance, but a much more
restrictive criterion, radically restrictive, by the way. Although, we do not have Mitleid with
a chair or a stone, it is somewhat likely that we have it with all animals, and it is possible
that we do not have it with all human beings. One criterion is too permissive and insensible
to differences and the other is too restrictive and impinges on the demand on generalization.
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Ultimately, we have an additional problem with the indeterminacy of what is being
extended by the analogical argument. Simply, we could ask: If we assume the result from
Section 18 holds, why then is it only the will and not other internal things that are extended
by the arguments? What about feelings, intellect, thoughts, passions? I do not have criterion
to determine the exclusivity of the will to the exclusion of other “things” which are also
present  in  my body  and  could  come  from,  or  be  experienced  alongside,  this  intimate
experience. And, furthermore, since it is “my” will that is being extended, what makes me
believe that the result of this extension will be one unique will, shared by all things and
beings,  and not  different  “wills”,  so  to  speak?  In  principle,  following the  lines  of  this
argument, it could be there are as many “wills” as things or beings in the world. And, at any
moment, although we do not know clearly when or where that should be, the possessive
“my”  from  “my  will”  has  to  be  dropped  in  the  extension  procedure.  The  world´s
thing-in-itself is “will” and not “my will”, although I reach this understanding from “my
will”. 
As I have already mentioned in the beginning of this paper, this is an additional
problem in Schopenhauer´s use of the analogical argument because these do not, in general,
collapse  the  element  that  is  being  extended  with  the  investigated  or  analyzed  domain.
Through our examples we have seen that it is not strictly the same liquid that can be found
in the cups at the party; in the same way that it is not the case that there are the same cells
circulating  through the  immune  system of  all  animals;  and,  similarly,  not  all  emergent
countries have the same economies nor do they circulate the same commodities or wares.
However, it must be the same will in the essence of all things in the world, the same will
that I “feel” in my body and which coordinates my acts and movements.
***
Right  from  the  preface  of  his  main  work,  Schopenhauer  already  lists  some
conditions for the understanding of his innovative book. Among them there is the need to
read the work twice and the demand for readers to also examine some of his previous
works, such as his doctoral thesis about the fourfold principle of sufficient reason. What I
would like  to  focus  on here,  however,  is  the first  demand Schopenhauer  makes  of  the
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reader: the understanding that in W there is one single idea presented in an organic form.
That is, like an organic system, his philosophy should be understood largely as a functional
whole which articulates its single idea  via different parts. In light of this, nothing like an
asymmetry between its parts could be expected to be found: consequently, for example,  its
aesthetics only sustain itself by its ethics, or vice-verse. His axioms or principles result in
theorems, in such a way that we would have axioms without theorems, but no theorem
without axioms. However, the idea of logical dependence or subordination does not seem to
hold in certain parts of a book which has – for editorial and publishing purposes – been
presented with a beginning and an end. Schopenhauer’s idea of his work’s organic feature
suggests that its parts sustain the whole and the whole appears through them, in a way that
it gives them meaning and unity, just as with a living body, where each part contributes to
the functionality of the whole, and the whole only exists and survives through a harmonious
functionality  of  each  part.  Keeping  this  in  mind,  the  reader  comes  to  accept  the
recommendation to read the book twice because, by doing this, we can then understand the
single idea that permeates everything there. As a matter of fact, the organic system of W
cannot be approached as a system organized in terms of axioms and theorems, in which the
logical hierarchy or asymmetry in the subordination and organization of its parts must be
strictly respected.  WWV is divided into four books, each comprising a number of sections
and each section comes to  corroborate  the vision or  perspective  of this  organic whole.
There are two key perspectives to WWV: one of which operates within the sufficient reason
principle,  while  the  other  functions  outside  this  same  principle,  which  manages  and
conditions all phenomena of the world.
The natural interpretation of all this is to affirm that Logic-theoretical features such
as trivialization, inconsistencies, completeness, decidability, among others, are not relevant
for the composition of an organic system, although they are central to the characterization
of a formal system. This contrast is even more evident in the case of inconsistency. One
suffices  to  bring  a  whole formal  system to the trivialization  and abandon,  while  in  an
organic system it can be harmless, if it can be localized and circumscribed. An organic
system  can  re-establish  itself  or  re-emerge  from  non-affected  parts,  in  the  case  of  a
problem. 
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Nevertheless, this is an ideal that is made fragile when we go into the details of
argumentation. For, Schopenhauer’s work, as with all living organisms, we can hold that
there are some parts which are more important or more vital for the functionality of the
whole.  It  is  natural  that  some  organs  or  structures  can  play  the  role  of  a  functional
protagonist in an organism. This fact suggests that - as some parts are more vital or more
necessary than others - when key parts incur a problem; the whole system probably will
also be affected by this problem. To make a long story short, a problem in this kind of
privileged area,  such as  the heart  or  brain of  a  person,  can lead the body to  diseases,
weakness or even to death. 
***
There  is  a  methodological  procedure  that  seems  to  legitimate  the  use  of  an
analogical extension in Schopenhauer´s Philosophy: roughly speaking, the importance of
having  an  understanding  of  the  macro  through  the  micro.  That  is,  the  suggestion  of
perceiving the general through the particular, or more specifically in our perspective here,
the  necessity  of  understanding  the  world  through  an  experience  of  our  bodies.
Schopenhauer affirms this methodology legitimacy with the following: 
Jeder findet sich selbst als diesen Willen, in welchem das innere Wesen
der Welt besteht, so wie er sich auch als das erkennende Subjekt findet,
dessen Vorstellung die ganze Welt ist, welche insofern nur in Bezug auf
sein Bewusstsein, als ihren notwendigen Träger, ein Dasein hat. Jeder ist
also  in  diesem  doppelten  Betracht  die  ganze  Welt  selbst,  der
Mikrokosmos, findet beide Seiten derselben ganz und vollständig in sich
selbst. Und was er so als sein eigenes Wesen erkennt, das Selbe erschöpft
auch das Wesen der ganzen Welt, des Makrokosmos: auch sie also ist, wie
er selbst, durch und durch Wille, und durch und durch Vorstellung, und
nichts bleibt weiter übrig. So sehen wir hier die Philosophie des Thales,
die  den  Makrokosmos,  und  die  des  Sokrates,  die  den  Mikrokosmos
betrachtete, zusammenfallen, indem das Objekt beider sich als das Selbe
aufweist19.
  
Accordingly, we must learn to understand nature through ourselves, not ourselves
through nature20. In this perspective, that which is directly known to us must give us the
19 SCHOPENHAUER, WWV I, p. 193.
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explanation for what is only indirectly known, not the converse. On this point, Janaway
explains: 
His [Schopenhauer´s] fundamental belief is that we can make sense of our
own existence and behavior by understanding our own inner essence as
will, and that there is an imperative to understand or ‘decipher’ the world
in the same way. This reveals an underlying assumption that my inner
essence must be the same as that of the world at large. This is a thought
which he expresses sometimes as the identity of the microcosm with the
macrocosm21. 
As a matter of fact, this methodological question, “to the macro departing from the
micro”, plays a great role in Schopenhauer’s philosophy, giving additional relevance to the
use of analogy, albeit not giving it validity nor the power to mitigate the other problems
discussed above.
Besides  this  methodological  justification,  it  may  be  revealing  to  note  how
Schopenhauer examines the world to make his exegetical model or unique idea, “the world
as  will  and  representation”,  more  vivid  to  the  readers´  admiring  eyes.  Schopenhauer
vitalizes  his  work  by means  of  everyday examples  taken from nature  and/or  naturalist
books - a technique much different to how traditional Philosophy would be developed. The
analogical  argument  used does  not  seem problematic  at  all  for  a  philosopher  with this
corroborative procedure to enrich his perspective. After having established his vision of
world,  we  can  clearly  see  the  necessity  for  Schopenhauer  of  seeing  his  philosophy
confirmed by the natural sciences, or by empirical observations. Nothing in metaphysics
that contradicts what is observable in nature – including the natural and incessant struggle
for survival and perpetuation - could be accepted. Nature science would be a contiguous
organ  in  this  great  Schopenhaurian  all-encompassing  metaphysical  organism.  Besides
delivering relevant forms of evidence, natural sciences would deliver the ultimate criteria
for  metaphysics:  If  this  does  not  make  us  understand  the  former  better,  it  must  be
abandoned.  To  have  a  metaphysics  that  is  not  confirmed  by  experience  would  be  a
sufficient basis for suspicions, even more so especially if it was vulnerable to arguments.
Schopenhauer does not seem to hold the analogical argument in Section 19 of the
WWV I as something merely figurative or as a metaphorical key. But the daily, or weak
20 Demzufolge müssen wir die Natur verstehen lernen aus uns selbst, nicht umgekehrt  uns selbst aus der
Natur.” (SCHOPENHAUER, WWV II, 219).
21 JANAWAY, 1999, p. 8.
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meaning of analogies, or even the use of analogy for arguments, can contaminate his work
if it is held as elusive (which, in fact, it is!). It seems to me that Schopenhauer assumes that
Section 19 must be reinforce with examples in WWV II through which he intends to show
the supremacy of the will in human beings and in nature. The supplementation of 19 with
natural  examples  can  be  anything  but  accidental. Nevertheless,  the  supplementation
exposed there goes in the direction of natural research, and not of the logical analysis of the
analogy components, as we would traditionally expect. Where there is a deficiency of good
arguments,  Schopenhauer  complements  his  work  with  natural  and  empirical  examples,
rather  than reorganizing  the internal  concepts  in  his  philosophy to give  cogency to his
arguments. 
This procedure is coherent with his polemical vision in respect to intellect capacity,
which – for him - is radically and unavoidably subordinate to the will. This fact justifies a
certain  doubt  of  Schopenhauer’s  about  the  possible  role  of  reason  in  conveying  more
elevated senses, meanings or values about the world. This fact is foremost visible in his
non-normative  aesthetics  and ethics.  Not  entirely  surprisingly,  the philosopher  calls  the
intellect  “a  body  parasite”  in  first  paragraph  of  the  Section  19  of  WWV  II.  For
Schopenhauer,  the  intellect  maintains  a  radical  relation  of  subordination  to  the  will.  I
believe that this viewpoint is a decisive factor behind why he does not carry out any logical
refinement  of  the  fragile  analogical  argument  in  Section  19.  There  is  a  chronic  and
consequent  suspicion  with  regards  to  intellectual  capability  in  producing  proofs  or
arguments in this area. As Spierling affirms:
Entgegen  der  philosophischen  Tradition  schaltet  Schopenhauer  den
Intellekt als den ursprünglich Ort des Willens aus. Wo immer der Intellekt
auftritt, in der Metaphysik spielt er eine sekundäre Rolle, seinem Rang
und  seiner  Kraft  nach.  Die  Erkenntnis  ist  ein  Licht  inmitten  der
grenzenlosen ursprünglichen Finsternis, in der es sich verliert22.
***
A comparison of Section 19 of  WWV I with its  supplementation in WWV II
makes us notice that the logical invalidity of analogical arguments wasn’t problematic at all
22 SPIERLING, 2003, p. 68.
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for Schopenhauer, since he was secure that many things in the world - indeed, practically
everything - could be listed as corroborative instances to reinforce what he was intending to
do: Schopenhauer aimed to make clear  to the reader that the world in itself  is a blind,
eternal, indestructible and grundlos will of life. “Mit allem Nachdruck greift Schopenhauer
auf Tierbeispiele zurück, um den sinnlosen Kreislauf des Lebens darzustellen wie seinen
Pessimismus zu verteidigen23.”  It sometimes seems as if Schopenhauer did not ultimately
need arguments to show to his reader the truth of his thesis, needing only that the reader
assume his metaphysics, through which to see through and perceive the extent to which
world  phenomena  could  be  easier  explained,  “bis  zur  empirischen  Naturerkenntis
herabgeführt”. As Schopenhauer maintains:
An solchen Erscheinungen also wird sichtbar, dass ich mit Recht als das
nicht  weiter  Erklärliche,  sondern  jeder  Erklärung  zum  Grunde  zu
Legende,  den  Willen  zum  Leben  gesetzt  habe,  und  dass  dieser,  weit
entfernt,  wie  das  Absolutum,  das  Unendlichen,  die  Idee  und  ähnliche
Ausdrücke mehr, ein reiner Wortschall zu sein, das Allerrealste ist, was
wir kennen, ja, der Kern der Realität selbst24. 
This kind of procedure:  “See the world through this  and you will  see that I am
right”, seems to be more cogent to Schopenhauer than any other arguments in the History
of  Philosophy,  even  strictly  legitimate  or  valid.  He  did  not  entertain  any  thought  of
anything  even  resembling  a  threat  to  his  Philosophy  by  means  of  the  analogical
argumentation. There is no contagion because there is no strict dependence. 
We can now list three elements that supply relevance to the analogy used in Section
19:  the  corroborative  forms  of  evidence  found  in  nature,  such  as  the  struggle  and
perpetuation of living beings observable in all nature levels and areas; the methodological
question  (micro  mirroring  the  macro)  and  the  uselessness  of  a  strictly  valid  proof  or
argument to justify the truth of his theses in an area that it is unreachable by intellectual
tools, be they good or bad ones.
I  believe  that,  working  within  a  generous  interpretation  of  Schopenhauer´s
Philosophy, withstanding all the paradoxes, invalid argumentation, inflamed rhetoric and
insufficiencies provoked by a strong kind of idealism, WWV I and WWV II do not fail in
23 SPIERLING, 2003, p. 70.
24 SCHOPENHAUER, WWV II, p. 399.
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being seminal works. This is primarily due to having interesting insights and originality in
relevant domains, such as: the aesthetics (foremost of which is Schopenhauer’s well-known
theory  of  musical  effect);  the  theory  of  sexuality;  an  Ethics  without  normativity;  his
criticism of Kant; and the investigation of important aspects of nature and human beings
which ultimately shows the irrationality that surrounds our actions all the time. As Janaway
affirms: “It is hard for analytical philosophy to claim him as a forerunner. One reason for
this, conventionally,  is that he is too literary and rhetorical a writer, too much prone to
metaphorical effusion and dogmatism, too little exercised by rigor and argument25”
The analogical argument seems not to be problematic to Schopenhauer, since his logical
strength  is  to  be  relevantly  complemented  by  corroborative  evidence  from nature,  such  as  the
nonstop struggle for survival and perpetuity between species and between individuals of the same
species.  This,  just  like  other  natural  phenomena,  has  shown  Schopenhauer  that  the  analogy
conclusion, i.e., that the will in itself of the world is a blind impulse to live, is correct. Positively,
we  can  conclude  that  for  Schopenhauer,  if  his  philosophy  could  be  somehow  confirmed  by
empirical observations and natural sciences, there would be no problematic argument that could
weaken its  truth.  In this regard, a certain criticism in Schopenhauer presents itself clearly:  it  is
useless  or  irrelevant  to  have proof,  rigorous or  not,  deductive or  not,  in  a  field that  is  strictly
impenetrable for such a rational enterprise.  Moreover, to hold that will is the essence of the nature
is a result of an attempt to decode its enigma via the interpretation of the will and not via a scientific
or traditional analysis investigation, which would be impossible in this context. I believe that all
these “conceptual and logical problems” tend to be natural consequences that come from a
radical position. Schopenhauer has a Philosophy of limits: limits of thoughts, knowledge,
and expression,  of  external  and internal  experiences.  In this  way, he has  to  stretch  the
common uses of language and reason and its traditional arguments to make them signs of
something  more  radical  (or  even the  most  radical  thing)  and,  in  turn,  making  it  more
perspicuous than our traditional way of facing things.  Pointing as he does, on the other
hand, to something existing independently of our knowledge. 
In  a  kind  of  historical-philosophical  balance  we  find  we  gain  many  more
interesting elucidations  about the world in which we live than we lose with his radical
arguments, which, although sustained are not particularly rigorous. For example, these days
in contemporary philosophy will is not dealt with anymore as a simple subaltern function of
25 JANAWAY, 1999, p. 2.
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intellect  but,  rather,  as something central  to the human constitution.  With WWV I and
WWV II, human will and its irrationality is at the core in continental Philosophy, since
Schopenhauer  makes  the human reason a  mere  Stepgap in  an inhospitable,  self-hungry
world. As the will is not the consequence of the world, but the world is the consequence of
the will.
The  organism,  even  if  ill-formed,  can  always  heal  itself,  if  and  only  if  it  is
sufficiently vigorous.  
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